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The Impact of Monetary Policy on the
Financing Behaviour of Firms in the Euro Area
and the UK
LEO DE HAAN∗ & ELMER STERKEN∗∗
∗De Nederlandsche Bank NV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, ∗∗University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT According to the ‘broad credit view’ bank-dependent firms are more strongly affected by
monetary contractions than firms with access to non-bank forms of external finance. Within the credit view
the bank lending channel focuses on the special role of bank loans, and predicts that monetary contrac-
tions reduce loan supply to firms facing information problems. However, the ‘relationship lending channel’
argues that, especially in bank-based economies, bank-dependent firms have close ties with banks, which
may reduce the sensitivity of their use of bank debt to monetary shocks. The sensitivity of corporate debt
structures to changes in the monetary policy stance is analysed using a sample of 22,000 firms in the Euro
area and the UK. Evidence is found for the credit view, the relationship lending channel, but not for the bank
lending channel.
KEY WORDS: Broad credit view, bank lending channel, relationship lending, monetary policy
1. Introduction
Asymmetric information in financial markets has serious consequences for corporate finance.
First, it creates a wedge between the costs of external and internal funds, which can be espe-
cially wide for informationally opaque (e.g. small) firms. Consequently, such firms may not be
willing to attract external capital and rely on internal finance instead (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Second, quantity rationing may occur, as external financiers are not willing to provide infor-
mationally opaque firms all the funds they need, because financiers are not able to fully assess
the credit risks involved (the so-called flight to quality; Bernanke et al., 1996). So, in the ‘broad
credit view’, credit market imperfections affect firms’ financing and investment decisions. Initial
credit frictions may be amplified by developments in other financial markets, for example an
equity price fall deteriorating firms’ balance sheets, and hence decreasing credit worthiness (the
financial accelerator).
Information problems and the emanating credit market frictions are also relevant for the way
monetary policy affects firms. The credit view involves two channels, the ‘balance sheet channel’
and the ‘bank lending channel’. The balance sheet channel corresponds closely to the financial
Correspondence Address: Elmer Sterken, University of Groningen, Department of Economics, PO Box 800, 9700 AV
Groningen, The Netherlands. Email: e.sterken@rug.nl
1351-847X Print/1466-4364 Online/06/050401–20 © 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/13518470500459840
402 L. de Haan & E. Sterken
accelerator mechanism: a monetary policy contraction may negatively affect firms’balance sheets
and credit worthiness, for example, making it harder to acquire new loans. This amplifies the
working of the traditional interest rate channel of monetary policy. The bank lending channel
on the other hand concerns the balance sheets of the banks: a monetary contraction drains their
liquidity positions, forcing them to reduce the supply of loans. Both channels are likely to work out
differently for firms that are informationally opaque and for which intermediated credit is the only
available source of external finance, on the one hand, and firms that are well known to investors
and have easy access to the public capital market on the other. In general, opaque and bank-
dependent firms will be affected more by a monetary policy contraction. Yet, it is conceivable,
especially in bank-based economies, where relationship lending is relatively important, that banks
invest in long-term relationships with their clients, thereby reducing the asymmetric information
problems by screening and monitoring. This could make bank-dependent firms less susceptible to
loan supply shocks. Hence, this so-called relationship channel could mitigate or even neutralize
the effects of the bank lending channel.
In this paper we analyse the sensitivity of debt structures of a large group (22,000) of European
firms to changes in monetary policy in the years 1990–1997. The firms in the sample are selected
from the 11 countries that joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) right from the start in
1999 and the UK. We distinguish total debt, short- and long-term bank debt, and trade credit.
We investigate the broad credit view, the bank lending channel, and the role of relationship
lending. One of the problems in establishing the bank lending channel is the identification of loan
demand and supply. Is a reduction of lending after a monetary policy contraction due to lower
credit demand by firms (because of a drop in investment expenditure) or to lower supply of banks
(forced by reduced bank liquidity)? This is a general problem when investigating the bank lending
channel, as that channel concerns the supply side only. This problem is solved in the literature
by the so-called identification through heterogeneity methodology, which can be applied to panel
data such as our sample of firms. This method involves splitting up the sample into groups of
firms according to characteristics that a priori can be expected to be indicative of the degree to
which a firm might suffer from credit constraints (for example, small versus large firms). Then,
assuming that demand conditions in the economy on average develop similarly for these groups,
one is able to interpret the differences in impact of monetary policy on borrowing behaviour as
originating from the supply side. A nice feature of our database is that we can distinguish firms
by legal form, i.e. private versus public firms. This is a useful distinction, as private firms are
significantly more bank dependent than public firms that have access to public capital markets.
Throughout Europe comparable legal definitions of public and private firms are used (we refrain
from a detailed analysis of remaining national differences here). Other distinctions that we make
are between small and large firms and high- and low-leveraged firms.
We focus on changes in the composition of liabilities on European corporate balance sheets
due to changes in monetary policy. The analysis of the composition of external funds can shed
light on the impact of monetary policy, especially by addressing the question whether firms are
able to switch from bank loans to other sources of funds. We do not address the issue whether
these changes in capital structure actually change the user cost of capital and through that capital
investment of firms (see Chatelain et al., 2003, for such a study for European firms). The present
study follows the line of research that deals with the relationship between corporate finance and
monetary policy as set out by Oliner and Rudebush (1996a, 1996b) and Kashyap et al. (1993,
1996). Our main contribution focuses on four elements. First, we present new micro-data evidence
on the impact of monetary policy on corporate debt structures for the whole Euro area, at the
same time providing new results on the main determinants of the capital structure of European
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firms. Secondly, we employ mainly legal form as a firm-level indicator of bank dependence and
informational opaqueness. Thirdly, we investigate the relevance of a country’s financial system
for corporate financial behaviour. Fourth, we investigate the influence of the business cycle on the
response of firms to monetary policy.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we first present an overview of the relevant
literature on the credit view and the relationship lending view on monetary transmission. Section 3
then describes the data. In Section 4 we present the empirical set-up and in Section 5 we discuss
the results. We summarize and conclude in Section 6.
2. The Credit View, the Lending Channel, and Relationship Lending
Imperfect information affects the working of financial markets. Both public and private asset
markets suffer from information problems and their consequences, such as agency costs, costs of
monitoring, screening, or auditing. Private financial markets, like the market for bank loans, are
likely to be affected more than public, e.g. equity, markets. The broad credit view focuses on the
effect of financial imperfections on monetary transmission (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994).
A change in monetary policy does not only have an impact on real economic activity via the interest
rate channel, but, for example, also through the role of e.g. loans. If credit conditions change as
a result of monetary policy, the ensuing revaluations of the net worth positions of agents can
amplify the consequences for real expenditure (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). The impact can also
manifest itself by changing conditions in other asset markets such as housing or equity markets
(Aoki et al., 2004), or in the balance sheets of firms (the so-called balance sheet channel). In these
latter cases the so-called financial accelerator is at work (Bernanke et al., 1996).
Specific attention in the broad credit view literature is given to the bank lending channel. In the
bank lending channel the focus is on the supply of loans by private banks. Here we can distinguish
two lines of research. The first line is initiated by Kashyap et al. (1993), who for the US examine
the composition of credit between bank and non-bank sources on the macro level. They find that
after a monetary contraction bank credit decreases more than non-bank credit (commercial paper).
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a, 1996b) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) criticized the results. The
latter argue that the macro-data used by Kashyap et al. may merely reflect that small firms are more
bank dependent and more sensitive to the business cycle than large firms and therefore respond
more to a monetary contraction by cutting back their demand for bank credit. Identification of the
bank lending channel on the macro-level is therefore problematic and can better be established by
estimating demand models exploiting heterogeneity between agents. The second line of research
of the bank lending channel therefore focuses on the behaviour of individual banks. Banks with
healthy balance sheet positions are more able to shield their loan portfolios from monetary policy
shocks and therefore are in a better position to maintain the old levels of loan supply after a
contraction (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Angeloni et al., 2003). For example, Van den Heuvel
(2002) addresses the role of capital adequacy requirements and shows that banks with low capital
show delayed but amplified responses to monetary contractions.
Next, we discuss a more recent microeconomic view on bank–firm relations, relationship lend-
ing, and turn to its relevance for monetary policy. The theory of relationship lending is based
on the notion that close ties between banks and borrowers can be economically beneficial (see
Sharpe, 1990; Boot, 2000; Elsas, 2005 for reviews of the literature). Relationship lending can
be defined as a long-term implicit contract between a bank and its debtor. Close ties between
the bank and the borrower create well-known benefits: intertemporal smoothing, increased credit
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availability, enhancement of borrowers’ payoffs, and more efficient decisions if borrowers face
financial distress. In bank-based economies banks have incentives to invest in such long-term
relationships and therefore to acquire more relevant information on the borrowers. As Boot
and Thakor (2000) show in a theoretical model, this investment in knowledge about the firm’s
conditions comes at a cost, but also has a benefit: the firm will be able to increase profitability.
Suppose that we observe a firm that has a close link with a bank. After a monetary contraction
both the firm and the bank have an incentive to maintain the existing lending relation, maybe
after some renegotiation on the terms of the loan. In such a case we expect, when estimating the
interest rate elasticity of loan demand, to find lower values for bank-dependent firms than for
firms that use relatively more non-bank finance. It is clear that small or more opaque firms benefit
from relationship lending ties. Larger firms, although they may have similar relationship lending
ties to smaller firms, are more likely to be sensitive to bank loan cost price changes, and will use
other sources of funds more quickly.
Thus, the above overview shows that two channels of monetary transmission, i.e. the bank
lending channel and the relationship lending channel, work in opposite directions for the impact
of the transmission of monetary policy. The bank lending channel amplifies, while the relationship
lending channel mitigates the effect of monetary tightening. This is the main theme investigated
in the empirical part of this study.
The existing empirical literature on relationship lending is mainly focused on the consequences
of relationships on loan pricing, credit availability, or efficiency of work-out decisions by banks
if firms face financial distress. A few studies analyse the incidence of relationship lending. One
of the problems in the literature is the identification of the ‘relationship component’ of loans.
Unfortunately we also lack good indicators of relationship lending at the firm level. We would
need indicators such as the length of banking relationships, the interest rates paid on individual
bank loans during these relationships (Keasey and Watson, 2000), institutional relationships such
as the German ‘Hausbanks’ (Elsas, 2005) and possibly other elements of loan contracts (see
the surveys by Harhoff and Korting, 1998; and Lehman et al., 2004) or information on lenders
(Sterken and Tokutsu, 2002). The balance sheet data we use in this paper do not include such
information. Therefore, we use a national indicator of bank dependence, based on the World Bank
indicators of financial structure (Beck and Levine, 1999), which measures whether a country is
bank or market based. Differences in bank basedness between countries reflect the availability
of public information about firms’ credit worthiness and the efficiency of banks in acquiring this
information, as De Fiore and Uhlig (2004) show.
Finally, we conclude this section with some remarks on the existing empirical results. In the
literature there are extensive overviews of empirical results obtained with credit view models.
We refer to Bernanke et al. (1996), Hubbard (1998) and Lensink et al. (2001) for an overview of
the impact of financing constraints on investment, and the results of the Eurosystem’s project on
monetary transmission (Angeloni et al., 2003). It is not our goal to give an extensive overview of
the broad literature; instead we focus on three relatively unexplored elements of this literature:
what is the impact of monetary shocks on the composition of firms’ liabilities, what is the impact
on the use of trade credit, and what is the evidence of relationship lending? To start with the latter:
there is no substantial evidence so far of the role of relationship lending, the single exception
being Mizen and Yalcin (2002). They find evidence for the UK that small, highly indebted and
younger firms are affected more by a monetary contraction than large, less-indebted or older
firms. They use the age of the firms as a proxy variable of relationship lending and so find indirect
evidence of its relevance. There is a larger body of empirical literature on the impact of bank
dependence on the formation of interest rates in individual loan contracts though (Lehmann and
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Neuberger, 2001; Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Although there is no clear unanimity, it seems that
long-lasting bank lending relations lead to ‘softer’ combinations of interest rates and collateral
requirements.
With respect to the impact of monetary policy shocks on firms’ financing decisions the first
study is Kashyap et al. (1993), who present an aggregated analysis for the US economy (we
discussed this study above). Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a,
1996b) show there can be large differences in financing behaviour between large and small firms.
Oliner and Rudebusch show that large firms rely on bank loans and issue commercial paper during
a monetary contraction; hence they do not confirm the bank lending channel. Mizen and Yalcin
(2002) find evidence of the broad credit view for the UK and for the bank lending channel as well.
Finally, there are only a few studies that analyse the role of trade credit in monetary transmission.
Normally one would expect to find that firms that face high asymmetric information costs (and
consequently cannot issue commercial paper) will use more trade credit in times of a monetary
contraction (Meltzer, 1960). Mateut et al. (2003) indeed find evidence of such a trade credit
channel. Nilsen (1999) finds that even large firms switch to trade credit, especially firms without
a bond rating.
3. Data
The source of the company database used in this study is ‘AMADEUS’ from Bureau van Dijk,
containing profit and loss account and balance sheet data, as well as information on number
of employees, legal form, etc., for more than 200,000 European firms. We use data for the
EMU-11 countries that adopted the euro in 1999 (so we exclude Greece), and the UK. We
filter the data in several ways. First, firms are selected on a consolidated level. Only when
consolidated data are not available in the file, unconsolidated data are used. This selection pro-
cedure avoids double inclusion of firms with both consolidated and unconsolidated data. We
merge several files each effectively containing some three years of data into one dataset for
the period 1990–1997. Second, we select companies with two-digit ISIC-codes equal to 15–37,
45, 50–52, 55, 60–63; these are firms with activities in manufacturing, construction, trade, and
transportation.
Table 1 gives the country representation of our sample. It also gives the number of firms
by legal form. About 55% of the companies in the sample are public and 45% private.1 The
main corporate governance characteristics of these two types of firms are the following. Public
firms offer shares to the public; these shares can be quoted on a stock exchange. Their lia-
bility is limited. Private firms do not offer shares publicly. The liability of the shareowners is
extended. In general, the equity ownership of public firms is dispersed, while that of private
firms is concentrated. To compensate for the differences in liability, reporting and disclosure
requirements for public firms are more binding than for private firms. So it is likely that private
firms are more opaque. The minimum share capital requirements are higher for public firms.
The requirements for quoted public firms are even more severe. We note that firm size – for
example, measured by total assets or employment – is not among the criterions for private or
public ownership. Share capital size is a criterion but that does not relate directly to total assets.
Only 2% of the firms in the sample have quoted shares, which makes the sample quite represen-
tative for the population of firms in continental Europe. Faccio and Lang (2002) show that 44%
of European firms are owned by families and that only for 37% of the firms the shares are widely
owned.
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Table 1. Number of firms in the sample
Public firms of which: quoted Private firms All firms
Austria 81 4 54 135
Belgium 4641 24 380 5021
Finland 1368 22 0 1368
France 12,525 113 1859 14,384
Germany 358 94 1138 1496
Ireland 36 23 177 213
Italy 6144 35 3543 9687
Luxembourg 77 0 28 105
Netherlands 304 138 2552 2856
Portugal 708 31 458 1166
Spain 5464 37 548 6012
Total EMU–11 31,706 521 10,737 42,443
United Kingdom 1883 938 15,318 17,201
Total sample 33,589 1459 26,055 59,644
Table 2 gives the liability composition of the firms in the sample. We observe that private
firms have more bank debt than public firms; they have almost twice as much short-term bank
loans. This implies that private firms are more bank dependent than public firms. Note that
Table 2 contains aggregate means: that is we measure total bank loans of all firms over total
assets. One could also calculate firm ratios and average these ratios. In such a case we are
able to test for significant differences between ratios. Testing reveals that all mean values are
significantly different even at the 1% significance level. The larger average bank dependence
of private firms makes the sample-split into public and private firms especially interesting, as
the legal form may be a good indicator of informational opaqueness. The lower bank depen-
dence of public firms may reflect the fact that public firms, being better known to the outside
Table 2. Capital structure by legal form. Ratios of total assets; aggregate averages for 1990–1997
Public firms of which: quoted Private firms All firms
Equity 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.32
Long-term bank debt 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.12
Other noncurrent liabilities 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.12
Noncurrent liabilities 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.24
Short-term bank debt 0.11 0.08 0.21 0.14
Trade credit 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.13
Other current liabilities 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17
Current liabilities 0.43 0.40 0.47 0.44
Total liabilities 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Memo items:
Total bank debt 0.23 0.22 0.33 0.26
Other debt 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.42
Median total assets (million euros) 11.3 67.6 10.7 11.2
Median number of employees 90 793 128 106
Note: Rows may not add up due to rounding.
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investors as a result of more intense disclosure, suffer less from asymmetric information prob-
lems than private firms and therefore have easier access to non-bank sources of external finance.
The softer disclosure and reporting requirements for private firms and the fact that their shares
are not publicly held make it likely that private firms are more opaque and prone to asymmetric
information problems than public firms. This distinction is different from the large–small firm
dichotomy more commonly found in the literature. As a matter of fact, the table shows that public
firms in our sample are not significantly larger than private firms. Medians for total assets are
comparable, while median employment is higher for private firms. Quoted public firms are on
average of course much larger than public firms, and therefore they are considered separately in
the analysis. As has been mentioned before, a small fraction of the sample consists of quoted
firms.
A second source of data that we use is the database on financial structure and economic
development from the World Bank. We use this database for the construction of a country-specific
indicator of bank basedness (BBj t ), defined as:
BBj t = 100 · PCj tSTj t + PCj t + PRBj t + PUBj t (1)
STjt = stock market capitalization, PCj t = private credit by deposit money banks, PRBj t =
private bond market capitalization and PUBj t = public bond market capitalization in country j
in year t. A high (low) value for this indicator indicates that the financial system of country j in
year t is bank (market) based. According to this measure, Austria and Germany are bank-based
economies, the UK market based; see Table 3 for a full overview.
Table 3. Indicator of bank-basedness












United Kingdom 40.02 Market
Explanatory note: BBj t = 100 · PCj tSTj t + PCj t + PRBj t + PUBj t ,
where STj t = stock market capitalization, PCj t = private credit by
deposit money banks, PRBj t = private bond market capitalization
and PUBj t = public bond market capitalization in country j in year
t. Note that Belgium and Italy are market based according to this
indicator due to the high proportion of public debt. Economies with
indicator values of 41.00 or higher are considered to be bank based.
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4. Empirical Model
Our main interest concerns the impact of monetary policy shocks on the financing behaviour of
firms. First, how do firms adjust leverage after a monetary shock? Second and third, how do firms
adjust their bank loans, both short- and long-term? Finally, what is the role of trade credit, being an
important source of short-term non-bank credit? Hence, we analyse the monetary policy impact
on four debt ratios:
– Total debt to total assets, DEBT. This is a common, overall measure of leverage.
– Short-term bank loans to total assets, STBANK, as our main focus is on the special role of bank
loans.
– Long-term bank loans to total assets, LTBANK.
– Trade credit to total assets, TRADE. This is a component of working capital, which in the
literature receives a lot of attention for its substitutability with bank debt in general and, more
specifically, in relation to monetary contraction (Meltzer, 1960; Petersen and Rajan, 1997).
Specifically, we wish to test whether elements of the credit view and the relationship lending view
can be found in the borrowing responses of the firms to monetary policy shocks. We therefore
employ the heterogeneity between firms with respect to their legal form. We already noted (in
Section 3) that private firms are more dependent on banks for external finance than public firms
are. We argued that this difference reflects the informational opaqueness of private firms relative to
public firms. We will use the opposite predictions by the bank lending channel and the relationship
lending channel regarding the differential borrowing responses to monetary policy shocks of
private and public firms to identify the monetary transmission mechanism. We estimate a model
of the type:
Yijt = α1MPIj t−1 + α2MPIj t−1 · LFij + α3MPIj t−1 · LFij · BBj t + α4MPIj t−1 · BBj t
+ α5LFij + α6BBj t + α7Xijt + α8 + eij t (2)
Yijt = one of the above mentioned debt ratios of firm i in country j in year t;
MPIj t−1 = monetary policy indicator for country j in year t − 1, for which we use the three month
(inter-bank) money market interest rate, which is common in the literature (Angeloni et al.,
2003) and is not suffering from discrete jumps as in the central bank rate; we use a one-year
lag as is found to be relevant in most of the literature (Angeloni et al., 2003);
LFij = dummy variable for the legal form of firm i in country j; one dummy PRij which is 1 for
private firms and 0 for public firms and another dummy QUOTEDij which is 1 for quoted
firms and 0 for unquoted firms;
BBj t = bank-basedness indicator for country j in year t;
Xijt = a set of conditioning variables, explaining capital structure choices of firm i in country j in
year t;
α1, . . . , α7 are coefficients and α8 the intercept to be estimated, and eit is the residual.
We thus use the short-term interest rate as the indicator of the monetary stance. An increase in
the short-term interest rate is considered to be a monetary tightening. The interest rate channel
predicts a negative impact of changes in the short-term interest rate on debt, short-term bank
loans, and trade credit, hence a negative value for α1. The coefficient α5 allows for different debt
structures for different legal forms of firms. Coefficient α6 denotes the impact of the nature of
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financial systems on corporate balance sheets. It is, for instance, likely that firms in bank-based
economies rely more on long-term bank loans. Coefficient α2 represents the differential effect
of monetary policy for different legal types of firms. We include two dummy variables, one for
private firms PRij , and another for quoted firms, QUOTEDij , respectively. Using the interaction
between the monetary policy indicator and the legal dummy variables can shed some light on the
identification of changes in demand for corporate debt. Finally we interact this interaction term
with BBj t to allow for different effects of the interaction between monetary policy indicators and
legal types in market- or bank-based economies. Our priors with respect to the monetary policy
indicator and the interaction terms are as follows:
– MPIj t−1: The traditional money view on monetary policy transmission focuses on the interest
rate channel. A monetary policy induced rise of the short-term interest rate reduces both interest
sensitive investment spending and the corporate demand for short-term (bank) debt. However,
this interest rate channel can have different implications for debt titles of varying maturity. It
is probable that short-term debt will be reduced after a monetary policy induced short-term
interest increase, but the impact on long-term loans is ambiguous. If the long-term interest
rate does not increase due to the monetary policy shock, long-term loans become a relatively
attractive source of finance. As explained in Section 2, the broad credit view encompasses the
bank lending and the balance sheet channels (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) that both enhance
the negative initial effects of monetary policy tightening. According to the lending channel
monetary policy tightening constrains the supply of bank credit, which exerts an additional
negative effect for bank-dependent firms. Hence, for short-term loans all channels lead to the
expectation of a negative coefficient α1 of the monetary policy indicator. For long-term loans,
however, the expected sign of this coefficient is ambiguous.
– MPIj t−1∗PRij : the interaction term of the monetary policy indicator with the private firm dummy
has been included to capture the possibility that private firms adjust their capital structures after
a monetary policy shock in a different way than public firms do. As argued in Section 3, private
firms are more opaque and hence more bank dependent than public firms. According to the
bank lending channel, it is to be expected that private firms be affected more when a monetary
contraction leads to a decreasing supply of credit. In that case coefficient α2 is expected to be
negative, at least for short-term bank debt and probably also for long-term debt. For trade debt
the coefficient needs not be negative when these firms succeed in replacing the drop in bank loan
supply by taking on more trade credit. Consequently, the sign of the coefficient of total debt is
unpredictable. The lending relationship view gives opposite predictions. Assuming that private
firms benefit from relationship banking as well as public firms, it could be the case that the
supply of bank credit to private firms is sustained, despite a monetary contraction, so that private
firms can hold on to their use of bank debt, provided that they are ready to pay a higher interest.
If public firms are not ready to pay more, diminish their demand for bank loans, and switch to
other forms of finance that are not influenced by monetary policy, the sign of the coefficient
of the interaction term would be positive instead of negative, especially for bank debt. Hence,
a lower interest rate sensitivity of bank borrowing for private firms than public firms could
be an indication of relationship lending. There is a problem with this interpretation, however.
Lower interest rate sensitivity of private firms could just reflect their lack of non-bank funding
alternatives. In order to control for this, we add the following interaction term:
– MPIj t−1∗PRij ∗BBj t : this term interacts the differential monetary policy impact by legal form
with the financial system of the country of residence. If relationship lending diminishes the
interest rate sensitivity of bank lending to private firms we expect the effect to be stronger in
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bank-based economies than in market-based economies. Hence, in that case we expect to find
a positive sign for α3.
– MPIj t−1∗QUOTEDij : For the interaction term of the monetary policy indicator with the
quotation dummy variable the reasoning goes analogously. Quoted firms are mostly very large
public firms which comply with the relatively severe disclosure and capital requirements that
are conditional for acquiring quotation on the stock exchange. Therefore, we assume that our
earlier argumentation for the public firms in terms of easier access to the public capital mar-
kets holds a fortiori for quoted firms. (We do not interact MPIj t−1 and BBjt with QUOTEDij ,
because of lack of non-zero observations.)
– MPIj t−1∗BBj t : monetary shocks in bank-based economies can have a different impact on
corporate financial structures than in market-based economies irrespective of the type of firm.
It is likely that the interest rate elasticity of short-term bank loans in bank-based economies
is lower than in market-based financial systems. All firms can move easier to public capital in
market-based systems.
We include conditioning variables Xijt to control for idiosyncratic effects on capital structure
decisions. These are explanatory variables that are often used in the literature to explain corporate
debt ratios, namely: interest expenses INT, the presence of tangible assets TAN and intangible
assets INTAN, firm size SIZE, depreciation DEPR, and earnings before interest and taxes EBIT
(see Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Ramb, 2000; Wanzenried, 2002 for
similar choices of sets of conditioning variables). Ramb (2000), who uses the same data source
(AMADEUS) as we do, finds that the impact of legal form (private or public firms; quotation)
on the determinants of capital structure is small for most countries. Hence, we do not have to
differentiate the control variables by legal form. All control variables are expressed as ratios to
total assets, except firm size, which is defined by the logarithm of total assets. Our priors with
respect to the expected signs of the coefficients of the control variables follow from the corporate
capital structure literature.
– INT : interest expenses may be an indicator of financial distress and/or imply the presence of
a large debt tax shield. Both interpretations lead to an expected negative sign of the coefficient
of interest expenses in the debt relations. Higher debt leads to higher interest expenses though.
Hence, endogeneity problems affect the sign of the coefficient of INT (see hereafter).
– TAN : tangible assets represent presence of collateral, which makes access to debt easier (so a
positive coefficient).
– INTAN : intangible assets denote lower collateral value (a negative coefficient). Titman and
Wessels (1988) show that firms with a relatively high proportion of intangible assets have lower
debt ratios. Intangible investment is also considered to be a proxy of high growth opportunities
for the firm. High growth options should, according to agency theory, negatively influence the
use of debt, and hence also imply a negative sign for this coefficient. In our sample there is no
correlation between TAN and INTAN (correlation coefficient is –0.05).
– SIZE: large firms are better known to the outside investors and likely to be well diversified so that
they have fewer asymmetric information problems and run lower business risks, respectively:
its coefficient should be positive.
– DEPR: a high depreciation rate implies the presence of large non-debt tax shields, making the
use of debt tax shields relatively redundant (hence a negative coefficient).
– EBIT: according to the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984) firms prefer internal finance to
external finance including debt. High earnings enable firms to finance their investment largely
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with retained earnings, so that substantial debt finance is not necessary. So the coefficient of
EBIT is expected to be negative.
5. Results
Before presenting our estimation results, we discuss two econometric issues. First, the error term,
eij t , in Equation 2 consists of a time-invariant error component uij plus an idiosyncratic error term
vijt , hence: eij t = uij + vijt . We can assume uij to be fixed or random. We tested for fixed versus
random effects using a Hausman specification test: a fixed effects specification is to be favoured.
Secondly, some of the explanatory variables are likely to be endogenous, notably interest expenses
INT. Clearly, a high debt ratio causes interest payments to be high.An instrumental variables panel
data estimator should therefore be applied. We use the two-stage-least-squares fixed-effects (or
within) estimator (Baltagi, 1995). The ratio of cash to total assets and the ratio of stocks to total
assets are used as additional instruments.
Before we estimate the model it is informative to explore the covariation of our core variables
a bit further (Table 4). First, the correlations between the total debt ratio and its components are
all positive, although the correlation with long-term bank debt is rather weak. Second, trade debt
appears to be negatively correlated with bank debt, both short-term and long-term, which suggests
that bank and trade debt might be substitutes (cf. Mateut et al., 2003). Third, it is noteworthy that
the signs of the correlations of TAN, INTAN, SIZE and DEPR with total bank debt, short-term bank
debt, and trade debt are opposite to the correlations with long-term debt (we skip firm, country,
and time indices from now on). Hence, we expect long-term bank debt to respond differently to
the conditioning variables. Finally, note that INT is indeed highly correlated with both DEBT and
STBANK, which was the reason for using instruments in the estimation as mentioned before.
Table 5 gives the results of the estimation of Equation 2. Before focusing on the monetary policy
effects, let us first discuss briefly the results for the control variables. Most of these firm-specific
capital structure determinants are highly significant and have the expected signs. As explained
above we expect a negative impact of interest expenses INT on the demand for corporate debt,
since INT may be an indicator of financial distress. On the other hand higher debt coincides
with higher interest rate payments. Table 5 shows that probably the latter effect dominates, since
INT affects the debt ratio, short-term bank loans and trade credit positively, despite the use of
instruments in the estimation. Apparently, the level of the debt service was not a constraining
Table 4. Correlation coefficients
DEBT STBANK LTBANK TRADE
DEBT 1.000
STBANK 0.345 1.000
LTBANK 0.188 −0.125 1.000
TRADE 0.420 −0.170 −0.274 1.000
INT 0.371 0.404 0.209 −0.053
TAN −0.115 −0.032 0.374 −0.350
INTAN −0.053 −0.030 0.143 −0.119
SIZE −0.156 −0.005 0.101 −0.387
DEPR −0.100 −0.108 0.177 −0.180
EBIT −0.229 −0.117 −0.068 −0.086
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Table 5. 2SLS Within estimation results: monetary policy indicator interacted
with firm type and financial system indicator
Yit = DEBTit STBANKit LTBANKit TRADEit
INTit 3.971∗ 2.409∗ −0.138 1.653∗
(15.29) (7.38) (0.24) (6.51)
TANit −0.128∗ −0.139∗ 0.239∗ −0.186∗
(14.84) (13.24) (13.58) (21.65)
INTANit −0.225∗ −0.071∗ 0.120∗ −0.211∗
(14.16) (3.70) (4.39) (13.57)
SIZEit 0.067∗ 0.045∗ 0.030∗ −0.011∗
(33.23) (15.99) (8.13) (5.51)
DEPRit −0.302∗ −0.224∗ −0.163∗ −0.067∗
(12.61) (7.88) (3.32) (2.81)
EBITit −0.397∗ −0.379∗ −0.160∗ −0.089∗
(36.72) (24.37) (10.58) (8.47)
MPIt−1 −0.145 −1.246∗ 0.407∗ −0.732∗
(1.60) (10.68) (2.80) (7.96)
MPIt−1∗PRi −0.254 0.240 0.292 −0.029
(1.54) (1.27) (0.08) (1.74)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗BBt 0.010∗ −0.004 0.000 0.011∗
(2.74) (0.91) (0.09) (2.97)
MPIt−1∗QUOTEDi 0.114 0.146 0.199 −0.145
(0.87) (0.96) (0.57) (1.10)
MPIt−1∗BBt −0.002 0.022∗ −0.002 0.008∗
(1.07) (8.53) (0.57) (3.78)
PRi −0.112 0.667 3.354 0.220
(0.14) (0.72) (1.92) (0.27)
BBt 0.033 −0.192∗ 0.322∗ −0.071∗
(1.05) (5.05) (6.75) (2.26)
INTERCEPT 0.492∗ 0.121∗ −0.151∗ 0.386∗
(46.07) (9.65) (7.66) (36.04)
R2 0.095 0.150 0.073 0.069
Number of obs. 81,734 70,509 35,084 82,499
Number of firms 22,782 21,295 14,922 22,929
Note: t-values are given within parentheses below the coefficients; ∗denotes their
statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. Country suffixes are omitted for ease
of exposition.
factor during the sample period, which in fact was characterized by relatively low and decreasing
nominal interest rates. TAN and INTAN are mostly fixed assets, which need long-term finance,
i.e. finance by investment loans or equity and not finance by short-term loans or lines of credit.
SIZE has a positive impact on all debt types, but a negative one on trade credit. Small-sized
firms apparently make more use of trade debt than large firms. Although the transaction motive
for the use of trade credit is probably important for firms of all sizes, the financing motive may
be particularly important for small businesses, because they are more likely to be rationed by
commercial banks than large firms are (Meltzer, 1960). Depreciation DEPR and earnings before
interest and taxes EBIT have negative signs as expected.
Our main focus is on the effects of monetary policy.As explained in Section 4, we are especially
interested in the empirical evidence of the credit channel and the relationship lending channel.
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It is conceivable that relationship lending can function like an extended internal capital market
(Kashyap et al., 1993) and thus reduce the sensitivity of bank loans to interest rate changes for
some groups of firms. In order to identify the relationship channel from the credit channel, we
include a control variable for relationship lending. As mentioned in Section 4, we use the extent
to which countries may be grouped according to whether they have a bank-based or a market-
based financial system as an indicator of the supply argument. We expect that the relationship
lending channel is more relevant in bank-based systems and therefore firms’ demand for debt,
but especially bank loans, should be less interest rate elastic. Hence, we focus on the coefficients
of MPI and especially its cross-terms with the legal form dummy variable PR and its interaction
with the financial system indicator BB.
From the estimated coefficients of MPI (Table 5) we conclude first that the signs of the co-
efficients of MPI are significant and negative in the equations for short-term bank debt and trade
debt, but significantly positive in the equation for long-term bank loans (the coefficient of MPI is
also negative for total debt, but not significant). The opposite signs of the coefficients for short-
and long-term debt imply that, after a short-term interest rate increase, firms switch from short-
to long-term bank debt. This maturity restructuring effect with respect to bank loans is likely to
follow from the relative price increase of short-term bank loans. This presumes that a rise in the
monetary policy interest rate is passed through to the price of long-term bank loans to a smaller
degree than to the price of short-term bank loans. In general, we can confirm the basic interest
rate channel.
We next turn to the parameter estimates of the cross-term MPI∗PR, which are in all four cases
insignificant. This suggests that the legal form in itself is not a distinctive factor for the impact of
monetary policy on firms’ financing decisions. In any case, we do not find statistical evidence of a
credit channel (in which case the coefficient of MPI∗PR would have to be significantly negative).
However, the coefficient of the interaction term MPI∗PR∗BB is significant and positive in the
equations for total debt and trade debt, although its magnitude is relatively small. This implies
that when, for example, the monetary stance gets tighter, contraction of the use of total debt
and trade debt is smaller for private firms in bank-based economies than it is for public firms in
market-based economies. So we find somewhat mixed evidence for the credit view. We do not
find substantial evidence of the bank lending channel, since the interaction term MPI∗PR is not
significant in the equations for short- or long-term bank loans. The interaction term MPI∗BB is
significantly positive for short-term bank loans, though. Thus, while we cannot find conclusive
evidence of the bank lending channel, we do find an influence of the financial system indicator
BB on short-term loans. In fact, the coefficient estimates for the cross-term MPI∗BB, which are
significant and positive for short-term bank debt and trade debt, imply that, irrespective of the legal
form of the firms, the negative monetary policy reactions of their uses of these debt categories
are less pronounced in bank-based economies than in market-based economies. This evidence
offers some support to the relationship lending channel, especially in the case of short-term bank
loans. Finally, the coefficients of the cross-term MPI∗QUOTED are insignificant in all equations,
implying that quotation does not seem to matter (in the following we do not further discuss the
insignificant results for QUOTED).
5.1 Sub-samples
We re-estimate the equations for sub-samples by firm size and leverage, respectively (Tables 6a
and 6b). The reason for this exercise is to investigate whether there are differences in financing
behaviour between small and large firms and between high-leveraged and low-leveraged firms,
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Table 6a. 2SLS within estimation results for large and small firms: selected
MPI coefficients with firm type and financial system indicator
Yit = DEBTit STBANKit LTBANKit TRADEit
Large firms (top 33 percentile with respect to SIZE)
MPIt−1 −0.508∗ −0.980∗ 0.027 −0.723∗
(2.50) (4.51) (0.98) (5.26)
MPIt−1∗PRi 0.593 −0.427 1.086 0.727∗
(1.46) (1.15) (1.53) (2.69)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗BBt −0.011 0.009 −0.019 −0.014∗
(1.26) (1.13) (1.28) (2.22)
MPIt−1∗BBt −0.001 0.018∗ −0.010 0.009∗
(0.31) (4.08) (1.63) (2.91)
Number of firms 7916 7471 5621 7975
Small firms (bottom 33 percentile with respect to SIZE)
MPIt−1 0.197 −1.039∗ −0.338 −0.276
(1.13) (3.84) (1.01) (1.22)
MPIt−1∗PRi −1.444∗ 0.094 −0.465 −1.545∗
(5.03) (0.22) (0.51) (4.14)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗BBt 0.041∗ 0.007 0.008 −0.038∗
(6.18) (0.70) (0.46) (4.40)
MPIt−1∗BBi −0.007 0.015∗ 0.020∗ −0.003
(1.76) (2.33) (2.00) (0.62)
Number of firms 6237 5745 3848 6290
Note: t-values are given within parentheses below the coefficients; ∗denotes their
statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. Country suffixes are omitted for
ease of exposition.
respectively. Small firms generally have less easy access to public capital markets than large firms
and their higher bank dependence could imply that their use of bank debt is relatively sticky (note
that the private/public firm dichotomy does not already account for differences in firm size, as
was mentioned in Section 3). As for leverage, generally high-leveraged firms run a greater risk
of financial distress than low-leveraged firms and consequently may be hit more severely by an
interest rate rise. This could mean that their debt usage would shrink, especially if a credit channel
is at work. If, on the other hand, high leverage means more relationship lending, their use of debt
may be relatively insensitive to interest rate changes. For reasons of space, Tables 6a and 6b give
the estimated coefficients only for MPI and the three interaction terms with the legal form dummy
variable PR, the financial system indicator BB, and the product of the two, respectively (the results
for the control variables are qualitatively comparable to Table 5).
The first two sub-samples consist of the top 33 percentiles and the bottom 33 percentiles of
the company size distribution, respectively. We measure size (SIZE) by the log of total assets.
The coefficient of MPI is significant and negative in the total debt equation (the first column)
for the sub-sample of large firms. This indicates that an increase in the short-term interest rate
leads to a significantly smaller use of debt. The cross-terms are insignificant in this equation;
hence neither legal form nor financial system seems to matter for large firms’ debt financing
response to monetary policy. For small firms MPI is not significant in the total debt equation, but
the interaction terms MPI∗PR and MPI∗PR∗BB are. They are negative and positive, respectively.
These results indicate that especially small private firms use less debt after a monetary tightening,
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Table 6b. 2SLS within estimation results for high- and low-leveraged firms:
selected MPI coefficients
Yit = DEBTit STBANKit LTBANKit TRADEit
High-leveraged firms (top 33 percntile with respect to DEBT )
MPIt−1 0.215∗ −1.111∗ 0.199 −0.033
(2.39) (5.26) (0.61) (0.19)
MPIt−1∗PRi −0.453∗ 0.188 −0.043 −0.698∗
(3.33) (0.64) (0.54) (2.60)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗BBt 0.012∗ −0.004 0.009 0.020∗
(3.73) (0.54) (0.56) (3.14)
MPIt−1∗BBt 0.001 0.027∗ 0.008 0.000
(0.48) (5.64) (0.90) (0.19)
Number of firms 8800 8468 5117 8968
Low–leveraged firms (bottom 33 percentile with respect to DEBT )
MPIt−1 0.371 −0.702∗ 0.665∗ −0.745∗
(1.09) (2.79) (2.65) (4.01)
MPIt−1∗PRi 0.239∗ 1.442∗ −0.040 1.123∗
(2.72) (2.31) (0.50) (2.36)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗BBt −0.046∗ −0.027∗ 0.010 −0.022∗
(2.37) (2.01) (0.60) (2.11)
MPIt−1∗BBt −0.038∗ 0.000 −0.024∗ 0.000
(4.12) (0.08) (3.04) (0.02)
Number of firms 5468 4828 3825 5459
Note: t-values are given within parentheses below the coefficients; ∗denotes their
statistical significance at the 5% level or higher. Country suffixes are omitted for
ease of exposition.
although somewhat less so in bank-based economies. This is consistent with the credit channel
and the relationship lending channel. The equation for short-term debt shows a relatively strong
and statistically significant negative effect of an increase in the short-term interest rate on the use
of short-term debt for both sub-samples of large and small firms. The magnitude of the coefficient
is not significantly different between the different groups of firms. This confirms the interest rate
sensitivity of short-term bank debt found earlier for the whole sample. The type of firm remains an
unimportant factor in the short-term bank debt equation for both sub-samples. Hence, there is not
much evidence of a bank lending channel here. As for long-term debt, the maturity substitution
effect that was observed for the whole sample (Table 5), is no longer significant in the estimations
for the sub-samples by firm size (i.e. the MPI coefficients are no longer significant in the long-term
debt equation). Finally, the combination of the coefficients of MPI and MPI∗PR in the trade debt
equation for these sub-samples imply that large public firms and small private firms decrease their
use of trade debt, while large private and small public firms hold on to it. Summarizing, Table 6a
reconfirms that there is evidence of the broad credit view and the relationship lending channel,
but not for the bank lending channel.
The third and fourth sub-sample consists of the top 33 percentiles and the bottom 33 percentiles
of the leverage distribution, respectively (Table 6b). Leverage is measured by total debt over total
assets (DEBT ). The combination of the re-estimated coefficients of MPI and the cross-term
MPI∗PR in the total debt equation imply that high-leveraged private firms decrease their use of
debt after a monetary contraction, whereas low-leveraged private firms increase it. Apparently,
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highly indebted firms face higher agency costs than low-leveraged private firms, and therefore have
to consolidate their debt structures during a monetary contraction. This is consistent with the credit
view. Interestingly, high-leveraged private firms bring back their leverage somewhat less strongly
in bank-based economies than in market-based economies (see the positive MPI∗PR∗BB term).
This could suggest some effect of relationship lending. Turning to the bank credit equations, the
strong and negative reaction of the use of short-term bank debt is again confirmed, that is for both
high-leveraged and low-leveraged firms. Again, this negative effect is stronger for high-leveraged
firms than for low-leveraged firms. Legal form is relevant for low-leverage firms: low-leveraged
public firms reduce their use of short-term loans after a monetary contraction, whereas low-
leveraged private firms increase it. High-leveraged firms in bank-based economies are a little less
interest rate sensitive than their equivalents in market-based systems, which is consistent with
relationship lending. The use of long-term debt increases after a short-term interest rise only
significantly for low-leveraged firms. Apparently, the switch from the relatively more expensive
short-term debt towards long-term debt is only feasible for low-leveraged firms. Finally, the use of
trade debt decreases after a short-term interest rate rise, but only significantly for high-leveraged
private and low-leveraged public firms. Table 6b again confirms that there is support to the broad
credit view, little evidence for the bank lending channel, and some indication for relationship
lending.
5.2 Business Cycle Effects
In a separate analysis we alternatively control for the phase of the business cycle, in order to
determine whether there are differential effects of monetary policy dependent on the state of the
economy. Our sample period contains one recession year, 1993, which stands out in the data (in
this particular year the average level of sales is significantly lower than the sample average). We
interact the monetary policy variable with a recession dummy variable REC, which takes on the
value of one in 1993 and is otherwise zero. In formal terms, the financial system indicator BB
in Equation 2 is replaced by the recession dummy variable REC. Table 7 gives the results. In
general, the outcomes confirm the earlier evidence. We find significant and negative effects of
the short-term interest rate on all the debt categories (now also for total debt) except long-term
debt where the effect is again positive. Interestingly, the coefficient of the cross-term MPI∗REC
is significant in all equations except in the short-term debt equation. Hence, it generally matters
for the monetary policy effect on firms’ financial decisions whether the economy is in a recession
or not. The coefficient of MPI∗REC is positive in the total debt equation. Its magnitude exceeds
the coefficient of MPI, which implies that the effect of monetary policy on firms’ total debt
financing is asymmetric over the business cycle. In the long-term debt equation this cross-term
is also opposite in sign to the (positive) MPI coefficient, but it does not exceed it, meaning that
the switch to long-term funding is smaller during recessions. In a recession a flat yield curve
might prevent private banks to supply long-term funds. This cross-term is significant and negative
in the trade debt equation, suggesting that the drop in the use of trade credit after a rise in the
short-term interest rate is larger during recessions. It should be noted that the short sample period
makes it hard to draw firm conclusions on the effect of the business cycle on firms’ financing
choices. Finally, the cross-terms with the legal form dummy variables PR and QUOTED are not
significant, except in the equation for trade debt. This suggests that the business cycle is a more
important factor for the firms’ financing responses to monetary policy than the identification of
the type of the firm.
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Table 7. 2SLS within estimation results: monetary policy indicator interacted
with business cycle indicator and financial system indicator
Yit = DEBTit STBANKit LTBANKit TRADEit
INTit 3.944∗ 2.366∗ −0.102 1.695∗
(15.28) (7.36) (0.18) (6.66)
TANit −0.126∗ −0.141∗ 0.233∗ −0.190∗
(14.36) (13.09) (13.80) (21.61)
INTANit −0.220∗ −0.076∗ 0.114∗ −0.218∗
(13.64) (3.93) (4.30) (13.74)
SIZEit 0.067∗ 0.044∗ 0.028∗ −0.012∗
(31.53) (15.23) (7.26) (5.73)
DEPRit −0.306∗ −0.213∗ −0.200∗ −0.055∗
(13.93) (8.25) (4.33) (2.50)
EBITit −0.395∗ −0.374∗ −0.155∗ −0.094∗
(35.51) (23.58) (10.07) (8.58)
MPIt−1 −0.211∗ −0.410∗ 0.589∗ −0.287∗
(4.42) (6.52) (4.49) (5.98)
MPIt−1∗PRi 0.082 0.017 −0.108 0.126∗
(1.59) (0.27) (0.97) (2.39)
MPIt−1∗PRi∗RECt 0.033 0.000 0.054 0.050∗
(1.48) (0.02) (1.06) (2.28)
MPIt−1∗QUOTEDi 0.128 0.180 0.173 −0.143
(0.98) (1.19) (1.01) (1.08)
MPIt−1∗RECt 0.344∗ −0.107 −0.426∗ −0.195∗
(7.12) (1.80) (3.00) (3.96)
PRi −0.083 1.671 4.678∗ −0.654
(0.11) (1.82) (2.77) (0.82)
RECt −0.041∗ 0.013 0.043∗ 0.011∗
(7.73) (1.94) (2.96) (1.96)
INTERCEPT 0.504∗ 0.050∗ −0.040∗ 0.353∗
(62.86) (4.56) (2.92) (43.52)
R2 0.099 0.150 0.062 0.074
Number of obs. 81,809 70,574 35,134 82,574
Number of firms 22,813 21,323 14,944 22,960
Note: t-values are given within parentheses below the coefficients; ∗denotes their sta-
tistical significance at the 5% level or higher. Country suffixes are omitted for ease of
exposition.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we analyse changes in the financing behaviour of firms in response to monetary
policy shocks. Our focus is on the differential responses of various types of firms: private versus
public, listed versus non-listed, large versus small, high versus low leverage, resident in bank-
based versus market-based economies. Our sample consists of these types of firms for the EMU-11
and the UK for the period 1990–1997. Our paper is on the interface between the literature on
corporate capital structure and monetary transmission, where the latter involves the broad credit
view, the bank lending channel, and the so-called relationship lending channel.
418 L. de Haan & E. Sterken
The main conclusions of the analysis are the following:
– There is evidence of the broad credit view, especially when looking at sub-samples by firm size
and leverage. Small private firms use less debt after a monetary tightening, although somewhat
less so in bank based economies. High-leveraged private firms bring back their leverage after
a monetary contraction (private firms less so in bank based economies), while low-leveraged
firms do not.
– The differential effects for bank-based versus market-based economies are indicative for the
relationship lending channel. Firms in bank-based economies typically are less sensitive to
interest rate changes than firms in market-based systems.
– Whereas there is a strong interest rate channel for short-term bank loans, there is little evidence
in favour of the bank lending channel.
– Firms switch from short- to long-term loans after a short-term interest rate increase, especially
low-leveraged firms.
– It matters for the monetary policy effect on firms’ financial decisions whether the economy is
in a recession or not.
Overall, we do find evidence of the credit view, but the bank lending channel receives less empirical
support than the relationship lending channel. This result asks for more research into the interaction
of the bank lending and the relationship lending channels, which requires a broader availability
of relationship indicators. Furthermore, we find differences in monetary effects on corporate
financing decisions between countries. This heterogeneity appears to relate to differences in
market structure, especially whether an economy is bank based or market based. These findings
may have relevant implications for monetary policy.
Our study reveals a number of items for future research. First, as we only included limited-
liability companies in our sample (in the form of public and private firms), it would be interesting
to extend this analysis to non-limited liability firms. We would expect the effects of monetary
policy shocks to be stronger for such small businesses. Another issue is the exact dynamics of
the impact of monetary policy. This would ask for higher frequency data than the annual dataset
available to us.
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Note
1 To give some examples of public and private firms, respectively, for the larger EMU countries: ‘SA’ and ‘SARL’ in
France, ‘GmbH’ and ‘AG’ in Germany, ‘SpA’ and ‘Srl’ in Italy, ‘SA’ and ‘SL’ in Spain, ‘Plc’ and ‘Ltd’ in the UK, and
‘NV’ and ‘BV’ in the Netherlands.
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